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In re Application of
Schubert, et al.

Application No. 10/534,240

Filed: October 24, 2005

Attorney Docket No. HM-621PCT

OFFICE OF PETITIONS

ON PETITION

This is a decision on the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a), filed August 20, 2009, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) is **DISMISSED**.

The above-identified application became abandoned for failure to respond to the Notice of Allowance and Issue Fee Due mailed January 28, 2009, that allowed a statutory period for reply of three months from its mailing date. No response was received within the allowable period and the application became abandoned on April 29, 2009. A Notice of Abandonment was mailed May 27, 2009.

A grantable petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a)¹ must be accompanied by: (1) the required reply,² unless previously filed; (2) the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(1); (3) a showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to this paragraph was unavoidable; and (4) any terminal disclaimer required by 37 CFR 1.137(c).

The instant petition lacks item (3).

The Commissioner is responsible for determining the standard for unavoidable delay and for applying that standard.

¹ As amended effective December 1, 1997. See *Changes to Patent Practice and Procedure*; Final Rule Notice 62 *Fed. Reg.* 53131, 53194-95 (October 10, 1997), 1203 *Off. Gaz. Pat. Office* 63, 119-20 (October 21, 1997).

² In a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may be met by the filing of a continuing application. In an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issue fee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof.

“In the specialized field of patent law, . . . the Commissioner of Patent and Trademarks is primarily responsible for the application and enforcement of the various narrow and technical statutory and regulatory provisions. The Commissioner’s interpretation of those provisions is entitled to considerable deference.”³

“[T]he Commissioner’s discretion cannot remain wholly uncontrolled, if the facts **clearly** demonstrate that the applicant’s delay in prosecuting the application was unavoidable, and that the Commissioner’s adverse determination lacked **any** basis in reason or common sense.”⁴

“The court’s review of a Commissioner’s decision is ‘limited, however, to a determination of whether the agency finding was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.’”⁵

“The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”⁶

The standard

“[T]he question of whether an applicant’s delay in prosecuting an application was unavoidable must be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking all of the facts and circumstances into account.”⁷ The general question asked by the Office is: “Did petitioner act as a reasonable and prudent person in relation to his most important business?”⁸ Nonawareness of a PTO rule will not constitute unavoidable delay.⁹

³Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F.Supp. 900, 904, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d without opinion (Rule 36), 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. Cir.1991) (citing Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843, 848, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg 849 F.2d 1422, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“an agency’ interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference”); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 81 L. Ed. 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984) (“if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”))

⁴Commissariat A L’Energie Atomique et al. v. Watson, 274 F.2d 594, 597, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (emphasis added).

⁵Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 93 S. Ct.1241, 1244 (1973) (citing 5 U.S.C. §706 (2)(A)); Beerly v. Dept. of Treasury, 768 F.2d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Mossinghoff, 217 U.S. App. D.C. 27, 671 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir.1982)).

⁶Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 77 L.Ed.2d 443, 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983)).

⁷Id.

⁸See In re Mattulah, 38 App. D.C. 497 (D.C. Cir. 1912).

⁹See Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (citing Potter v. Dann, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (D.D.C. 1978) for the proposition that counsel’s nonawareness of PTO rules does not constitute “unavoidable” delay)). Although court decisions have only addressed the issue of lack of knowledge of an attorney, there is no reason to expect a different result due to lack of knowledge on the part of a pro se (one who prosecutes on his own) applicant. It would be inequitable for a court to determine that a client who spends his hard earned money on an attorney who happens not to know a specific rule should be held to a higher standard than a pro se applicant who makes (or is forced to make) the decision to file the application without the assistance of counsel.

In the instant petition, petitioner maintains that the circumstances leading to the abandonment of the application meet the aforementioned unavoidable standard and, therefore, petitioner qualifies for relief under 37 CFR 1.137(a). In support thereof, petitioner asserts that credit card that petitioner authorized to be charged the issue fee had should have had sufficient amounts available to charge the issue fee on May 4, 2009, however, the transaction was declined by the credit card company because the credit card company withheld a payment petitioner made that would have made sufficient funds available to charge the issue fee payment.

A successful petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) requires that petitioner establish that the apparent error, which caused the delay in responding to the Office action, was unavoidable. The term 'unavoidable' is interpreted to mean that petitioner has taken all reasonable and prudent steps to ensure that a proper response is received within the period for reply set forth, and despite such efforts, petitioner was not able to file a timely response. A failure of the credit card company to credit a payment petitioner made to the credit card so that funds would be available to charge the issue fee payment is not an unavoidable circumstance. It is reasonable to expect that, prior to submitting the Issue Fee Transmittal Form with the credit card authorization, that petitioner would make sure that the credit card petitioner is authorizing to be charged has sufficient funds available on which to charge the issue fee. Further, it is noted that petitioner authorized a deposit account to be charged in the event the credit card was declined. A review of the application file reveals that the deposit account only had \$1.00 in it on May 4, 2009. Petitioner neither checked to see if the credit card was able to be charged nor checked the balance of the deposit account prior to submitting the Issue Fee Transmittal form. Petitioner has not demonstrated that petitioner acted reasonably and prudently relative to filing a timely response to the Notice of Allowance and Issue Fee Due such that the delay in filing a timely response would be considered unavoidable. The petition is dismissed, accordingly.

Petitioner may wish to consider filing a petition to revive based on unintentional abandonment under 37 CFR 1.137(b). A grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by the required reply (already submitted), the required petition fee (\$1,620.00 for a large entity and \$810.00 for a verified small entity), and a statement that the **entire** delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional.

Further correspondence with respect to this matter should be addressed as follows:

By mail:

**Mail Stop Petitions
Commissioner for Patents
Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450**

By facsimile: (571) 273-8300
Attn: Office of Petitions

Telephone inquiries regarding this decision should be directed to the undersigned (571) 272-3222.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Kenya A. McLaughlin".

Kenya A. McLaughlin
Petitions Attorney
Office of Petitions